Statutory Silence: How Anti-Protest Legislation Threatens Youth-Led Civic Engagement in Modern Democracies

By Zahra Ali, Pakistan

Abstract

Modern democracies have witnessed the rise of restrictive public order laws during the last decade. As a result of their adoption, the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of protest becomes blurred. Such legal schemes typically provide police with broad discretionary powers and offer various sentencing enhancements for convicted demonstrators. This article aims to demonstrate how anti-protest legislation detriments youth-based activism. After analyzing the key weaknesses of the younger generation in the context of the established lobbying mechanisms, the chilling effects of the expanded state regulation on their involvement in the decision-making process will be discussed.

Introduction

Freedom of assembly is recognized as one of the fundamental rights that lay the foundation for any democratic society. It enables groups of citizens who are not in a position to directly influence the passage of legislation to express their opinion and force policymakers to consider their demands. However, liberal democracies have seen a surge in anti-protest legislation in recent years. As a result, restrictions on gathering now dominate the debate over the balance between security and personal liberties.

When the state starts to use its resources to deter and punish assemblies of any kind more severely, whether they are authorized or not, their overall impact is significantly reduced. Although such laws affect all segments of the population, they can have a disparate effect on different population groups. In particular, youth activists should be highly concerned about the introduction of restrictive regulations in their activity. Given their relative lack of resources, non-mainstream actors have no choice but to resort to traditional methods, such as street protests, to maximize their political power. Understanding how public order laws limit the ability of these actors to influence the system is crucial for further development.

The Concept of Public Order Laws

The public gatherings of the population are not only characteristic of times of social unrest, as history demonstrates. The right to peaceful assembly, as well as the limitations regarding it, has been debated for much of the last century. In particular, the signatory states of the ECHR have acknowledged that any collective action may entail some level of inconvenience to members of the public.

However, this recognition does not imply that assemblies per se are unlawful. The interference by the state with the gathering of people requires justification in terms of proportionality and necessity. Recent legislative changes and amendments adopted by several liberal democracies contradict this principle, as authorities seek to weaken the opposition’s ability to organize and mobilize supporters. According to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023, which came into force in England and Wales, demonstrations can be classified as illegal if they cause an “inconvenience” to the public.

Some of the relevant legislative changes include:

• The adoption of vague terms, such as “nuisance,” “annoyance,” or “inconvenience,” to establish the boundaries of acceptable protest.

• Enhanced stop-and-search powers to detect “any person suspected of being present at a public order incident.”

• Additional restrictions on assemblies, including those adopted under “public safety” and related to “lock-on,” “equipment,” and “infrastructure.”

Mechanisms of the “Chilling Effect” on Youth Activism

The interaction between the public security laws and youth activism produces certain limiting mechanisms that reduce the level of participation before any single rally or demonstration.

The first mechanism is the long-term consequences of the charges for the participants. For the youth, who are starting their professional careers, the charges and arrests for the offense that is newly added to the law books can have devastating consequences. Being convicted or even just being arrested and having this information in the past employment records can prevent them from finishing college, receiving a professional license, or traveling abroad. Thus, for young people, the risks are much higher than for middle-aged or senior activists who already have a stable career. Such high risks reduce the participation of the youth in activism significantly.

The second mechanism is the shift in the narrative about the rally from the issue to the law. When the police start to interpret rallies through the prism of the public order, the whole discourse about the rally is shifted from the issues it raises to the issues of the law and its enforcement. If the rally issues are important to some people and they want to influence the government decisions on these issues, such an approach will make them consider their actions as anti-social rather than civic. The media will shift the narrative to the problems of enforcement rather than the issues raised by the rally.

The third mechanism is the surveillance of social media. In the current protests, social media has become the central platform for organizing. However, such coordination methods are easily tracked by the authorities, who can use this information for further arrests or to identify the coordinators of the rally. For young people, who often rely more on such methods for communication and coordination, the knowledge of being tracked by the authorities serves as a deterrent from engaging in activism. Thus, the chilling effect prevents young people from expressing their views openly, both on social media and in real life.

International Human Rights Standards and Domestic Law

There is a conflict between international human rights standards and domestic public order laws. The international community, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, recognizes the right of states to restrict protests and rally in the name of public order. However, it also recognizes that the state has a duty to ensure that the right to protest is not limited by the law.

When statutory definitions erode the distinction between violent assembly and non-violent disruption, domestic legal systems fail to uphold international proportionality tests. By prioritizing frictionless economic activity over fundamental expression, states risk transforming the right to assembly from a protected constitutional guarantee into a conditional privilege granted at executive discretion.

This tension between the authority of statutes and the judiciary is particularly evident in recent debates in the UK parliament about public order. The regulations concerning public order imposed by the Home Office under the Public Order Act 2023, which sought to clarify what constitutes a level of “serious disruption” to the point of police intervention, were ruled as unlawful by the High Court. This decision, which was overturned on appeal, was based on the interpretation that the new regulations do not provide sufficient parliamentary oversight of the executive’s expanded powers to intervene. At the same time, the Home Office’s attempt to ban direct action groups such as Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000 sparked a fierce debate in court about the definition of “serious damage to property,” ultimately resulting in the High Court ruling in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State as restricting rights under Article 10 and 11 of the European Convention in an unreasonable manner. While the latter decision was also appealed, both instances demonstrate that current legislation often fails to distinguish between acts of civil disobedience and legitimate exercises of freedom of expression while concurrently diminishing the role of the judiciary in overseeing the executive’s decisions.

The trend in modern legislation changes threatening the future of democracy should be permanently reconsidered. It appears that today, states tend to develop laws that allow them to restrict and penalize any non-violent forms of public dissent with unacceptable severity. This approach to maintaining stability undermines the very foundations of democracy. It should be remembered that young people are those who bring change to countries and societies. Therefore, if states want to ensure the vitality of their democratic institutions, they must review the current public order laws.

References

European Court of Human Rights (1950) European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/european-convention-on-human-rights.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (2022) c. 32. UK Parliament. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/32/contents. 

Public Order Act 1986 (1986) c. 64. UK Parliament. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/contents.

Public Order Act 2023 (2023) c. 15. UK Parliament. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/15/contents.

R (Ammori) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2026) [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin). High Court of Justice of England and Wales. Available at: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2026/292.html.

R (Liberty) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2024) [2024] EWHC 1181 (Admin). High Court of Justice of England and Wales. Available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/r-liberty-v-secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department/.

Terrorism Act 2000 (2000) c. 11. UK Parliament. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents.